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Abstract Water governance in rural Namibia has pro-
foundly changed since the early 1990s. After indepen-
dence and in accordance with global environmental pol-
icies, it became a central theme of Namibia’s environ-
mental legislation to transfer the responsibility for man-
aging natural resources to local user associations. In this
article, I explore the emergence of new social forms at
the intersection of existing cultural models and new ra-
tionalities for governance. Doing so combines an analy-
sis of state legislation with the micro-politics of water
governance in 60 pastoral communities. The ethno-
graphic analysis reveals that different actors, including
state bureaucrats as well as rich and poorer herd
owners, have different understandings of how to share
water. While the poorer often agree with the state policy
that water is an economic good and should be paid for
accordingly, only in about half of the communities do
corresponding institutional regimes emerge. Using criti-
cal institutionalism as a theoretical guide, I offer a con-
tribution to understanding how more than 20 years after
Rio local institutions of resource governance emerge at
the intersection of different, and often heterogeneous
and intertwined, social fields.
Keywords Natural resourcemanagement .Water .
Institutions . Governance . Namibia
Introduction
In the arid environment of northwestern Namibia, almost all
households own cattle and small stock. Water and land are the
two central natural resources, and until the 1990s, their access
was regulated by the South West Africa administration under
the jurisdiction of the colonial South African state. Under this
administration, local level water governance was largely in the
hands of political authorities, including big men,1 headmen,
and chiefs. Since the colonial state covered the costs of run-
ning and maintaining the infrastructure, little local coordina-
tion was required. Water was basically free.
Starting in the early 1990s, water governance in rural
Namibia has profoundly changed. After independence and in
accordance with global environmental policies, it became a
central theme of Namibia’s environmental legislation to trans-
fer responsibility, costs, and benefits of resource management
to local user associations. The process goes hand in hand with
a redefinition of the role of the state. While the state pulled
back from governing natural resources actively, governing
authorities initiated far-reaching legislation that circumscribes
communities’ ways of doing so. The legislation is founded on
concepts like Community-Based Natural Resource
Management (CBNRM) and Integrated Water Resources
Management (IWRM) that contain clear premises about the
nature of resources and their appropriate uses (Barnes et al.
2002; Hoole 2009; Jones and Murphree 2001; Schnegg and
Bollig 2016; Silva and Mosimane 2013; Vette et al. 2012).
The implementation of CBNRM and IWRM led to a drastic
reconfiguration of the institutional landscape in rural Namibia
and hundreds of communities had to find Bnew^ ways for
governing one of their two salient natural resources, water
1 Big men are influential individuals who do not have formal authority
but command respect through personal skills.
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(Bollig and Menestrey Schwieger 2014; Falk et al. 2009;
Menestrey Schwieger 2015; Schnegg and Bollig 2016;
Schnegg et al. 2016; Schnegg and Linke 2015).2
The aims of this article are to explore (1) which institutions
of water governance emerged at the intersection of new ratio-
nalities for governance and existing social and cultural forms
following independence in 1990 and to explain (2) under
which circumstances one or the other institutional regime is
more likely to develop and prevail. To answer both questions,
I introduce a theoretical framework that addresses the negoti-
ation of institutions at the intersection of state policies and
communal micro-politics. Then, I present the research design,
the data, and the study sites. The remaining sections show
which institutional blueprints are carried into the communities
and how and why these are implemented or not.
Theoretical Framework
I use a number of related theoretical concepts as a guide to
explain the emergence of Bnew^ social forms at the intersec-
tion of different rationalities for governance. Moore has de-
fined a semi-autonomous field as a social setting including
different actors who can generate rules and coerce compliance
with them to analyze comparable situations (Moore 2000:57).
Social fields are semi-autonomous because they are embedded
within larger legal and political frameworks and connected
with one another. In Moore’s analysis, the state plays a major
role. Moore argues that legislation is the most usual way in
which central governments invade social fields within their
political boundaries. Although laws are often passed to alter
existing social arrangements, traditional Bsocial arrangements
are often effectively stronger than the new rules^ (Moore
2000:58).
Building on Moore’s work, Lund has explained that public
authority is not an either or of different rules but often a hybrid
of state policies and local practices (Lund 2007a, 2007b,
2011). He coined the term twilight institutions to refer to pro-
cesses that cannot be understood by focusing on Bthe state^ or
the state-society dichotomy alone (Lund 2007a:15). Rather,
and as Abrams has shown so convincingly, the state is both
an idea and a system (Abrams 1988). These elements of the
state are not given but made in daily routines and by a wide
range of actors. At the intersection between state and society,
public and private, and negotiated by a variety of actors twi-
light institutions emerge often containing and translating ideo-
logical elements of the state to other public domains (Lund
2007a).
Extending the analysis beyond the relationship be-
tween society and the state, Cleaver has argued that
institutions are embedded in a range of social and cul-
tural fields (Cleaver 2002, 2012; Cleaver and de Koning
2015). For her, embeddedness has two dimensions:
First, Cleaver argues, rules are transferred from one so-
cial field to another, e.g., people build new institutions
based on their experience with existing ones. Second,
rules do not fulfil one purpose alone, i.e., rules formu-
lated for managing water do not just manage access to
and distribution of water but may equally control land
and membership in social groups (Cleaver 2012).
Moore, Lund, Cleaver, and other scholars (De
Koning and Cleaver 2012; Hall et al. 2014; Leach
et al. 1999; Mosse 1997; Saunders 2010, 2014) share
a set of central assumptions that guide my analysis:
First, a social field like water management is not fully
autonomous. It is embedded in different normative or-
ders and locally situated forms of sociability. Those
normative orders may be structured by state sponsored
legislation with the goal of regulating the ways commu-
nities govern their resources (e.g., water). Alternatively,
existing social institutions may provide procedures
intended to regulate different or interconnected social
fields (e.g., sharing food or land) (Schnegg and Linke
2015) and these may be extended to or adapted for
water management. Secondly, heterogeneous social ac-
tors, including resource users, state bureaucrats, and
NGO representatives, negotiate both sets of processes.
While these approaches put the embeddedness of institu-
tions center stage, they do not explain when and why one set
of rules becomes salient or not. As I show here, theoretical
modes developed at the intersection of social anthropology
and new institutional economics can account for these varia-
tions (Acheson et al. 1998; Ensminger 1992, 1998; Haller
et al. 2013; Menestrey Schwieger 2015). For new institutional
economics, transaction costs and bargaining power are central
concepts (Ensminger 1998; Knight 1992). Transaction costs
refer to the costs involved in carrying out an exchange, e.g.,
the costs involved in getting information about the availability
and quality of a good, transportation, etc. Institutions reduce
transaction costs, when they make behavior predictable.
Theoretically, actors favor institutions that lower (their) trans-
action costs and institutions develop in a direction that lowers
overall costs involved in making exchanges. Furthermore,
each individual opts for institutional solutions that serve his
or her distributional goals (Ensminger and Knight 1997;
Knight 1992; Knight and Sened 1995). The more bargaining
power an actor has, the more likely they can establish his or
her preferred rules. To summarize, the goals and interests of an
actor in combination with their bargaining power and the costs
that an institutional regime is likely to produce can help to
explain why one set of rules is established and another not.
2 In this paper, I used the terms institutions and institutional regime inter-
changeably to denote a set of rules that concern a specific social field, here
water management.
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Methods
Research Design and Data
The data analyzed here were collected in northwestern
Namibia by a team of anthropologists between 2010 and
2016 (M. Bollig, M. Schnegg, Th. Kelbert, D. Menestrey,
Th. Linke, K. Gradt) as part of a German Research Council
(DFG) funded research project Local Institutions in
Globalized Societies (LINGS) (Bollig and Menestrey
Schwieger 2014; Schnegg 2015; Schnegg and Bollig 2016;
Schnegg et al. 2016; Schnegg and Linke 2015). The two prin-
ciple investigators, Schnegg and Bollig, have been conducting
ethnographic fieldwork in the region since 1994 (Bollig) and
2003 (Schnegg), respectively, and are responsible for the over-
all design and comparative analysis of the data. In the first
phase of the current fieldwork, three anthropologists
(D. Menestrey, Th. Linke, K. Gradt) stayed for roughly
one year between 2010 and 2011 in the southern
(Fransfontein), central (Otwani) and northern (Okangwati)
parts of the research area to get an in-depth understanding of
processes entailed in negotiating and crafting new institutions
through daily routines. The qualitative data presented below
were collected as part of ethnographic fieldwork and stem
from all three research sites.
After an initial analysis of the ethnographic data collected
during 2010 and 2011, we returned to the field in late 2012 to
conduct the up-scaling research we had designed to study the
distribution of some of the phenomena found in the commu-
nity ethnographies. Since our study treats communities as
cases, it is costly and methodologically challenging to get
relatively large numbers of observations that permit meaning-
ful comparisons. To achieve this end, we designed an interview
guide to elicit information at the community level. For geo-
graphical areas of approximately 250 km2 surrounding
Fransfontein, Otwani, and Okangwati, 60 communities were
sampled concentrically around the localities we had researched
in depth in preceding years. We decided against a representa-
tive sample of the entire Kunene Region due to the size, bad
road infrastructure, logistical constraints, and a lack of a list of
communities that could serve as a sampling frame. In addition,
our approach allowed making use of the fact that fieldworkers
were already known and trusted in the target areas.
During the community visits, we elicited rules of water
management and the composition of community-based orga-
nizational structures for water governance. Each focus group
discussion took place in public and included both female and
male informants of whom some were active in the committee
responsible for community-based water resource manage-
ment. The focus group discussions were semi-public so that
people could join in during a session. In most cases, it took
two days to complete a focus group discussion in any one
community. In total, we visited 60 communities. Since
information remains incomplete for some of them, the quan-
titative analysis presented here considers 56 cases.
A significant part of the data was already coded when en-
tered into the database designed for our project purposes. The
data set incorporates more than 50 variables that contain, for
example, information about institutional regimes, institutional
history, technological infrastructure, population size, demo-
graphic composition, and livestock ownerships. Although
most of the variables were already coded in the survey, two
variables that we consider in this analysis were not: the rules
for water management and the involvement of the state. For
the coding, I categorized the rules for contributions from com-
munity residents into those proportional to use and those
where this is not the case (see below). The coding was
cross-checked by the other members of the research team.
Tomeasure the involvement of the state, we use two indicators
based on information collected in the focus groups. First, we
asked about the frequency and purpose of visits by state offi-
cials to the community during the last two years. When state
officials visited a community at least once during the previous
year for consultancies and activities other than urgent repairs
of broken infrastructure, this served as an indication of more
than average state involvement. Generally, we found state
officials want to push communities in certain directions, above
all concerning the payment schemes for water use. Second,
our ethnographic observations showed that some employees
of the ministry or commissioned NGOs lived in the commu-
nities at issue. In these cases, the impact of the state was
significantly stronger because those people typically wanted
their communities to be flagship cases for the state’s mission
and ideology (see below) and thus worked consistently with
other residents in the hope of achieving this. For the analysis,
we coded state involvement to be above average, if either of
the two indicators (more than one visit per year or a state
authority in residence) was given.
Study Sites
Pastoralism is the dominant subsistence strategy throughout
the research area, and dependency on natural resources is
high. Like water, pastures are communal property. But in con-
trast to water, the organization of grazing does not incur mon-
etary contributions and the cost-sharing arrangements that we
describe for water do not apply here. With grazing, land
boundaries and access are salient and typically regulated by
local communities under the auspices of traditional authori-
ties, land boards, and chiefs.
In arid Kunene, pastoral livelihood is constrained by the
environment, most notably the low and unpredictable precip-
itation (Bollig 2006; Schnegg and Bollig 2016; Schnegg et al.
2013). Annual rainfall varies between 200 and 300 mm and
occurs in summer, between November and April. In the arid
environment, access to more than 25–30 ha of land is needed
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during a year to sustain one head of cattle (Burke 2004). A
head of cattle drinks about 27 l and goats/sheep 2.2 l (Wilson
2007:60f) of water each day. For comparison, humans use
about 20 l of water for drinking and sanitation per day if water
has to be carried to the house.3 With large cattle herds, the
amount of water used for animals is thus significantly higher
than that which humans consume.
While pastoralism is the dominant subsistence strategy in
the area, the region is heterogeneous in terms of ethnicity and
the ways pastoralism is practiced and integrated into the labor
market. Even though an ethnographic sketch heremust remain
superficial, I offer a glimpse of the local context as back-
ground. Various ethnic groups including the Damara, Nama,
Ovaherero, and Ovambo inhabit the communal settlements in
southern Kunene, located near Fransfontein. Under South
African rule, the area was part of the so-called Damaraland
homeland. In contrast to the other research regions included,
Fransfontein has a more favorable connection with Namibia’s
urban centers, and wage labor plays a significant role in
household economy. Households usually possess less live-
stock than further north, and people make use of diverse eco-
nomic strategies to make a living. Nonetheless, pastoralism
still shapes daily life in the communal settlements (Greiner
2011; Pauli 2011; Schnegg et al. 2013). The area of Otwani,
situated halfway between Sesfontein and Opuwo, is mainly
populated by the Ovaherero people. During South African
colonial rule, this region was part of the so-called
Kaokoland homeland. People there mainly make a living
through pastoralism and seek access to local livestock sales
markets, although there is also a partial integration of this area
into the wage labor market. In the northernmost region around
Okangwati, pastoralism again is the dominant economic ac-
tivity. Although also part of the former so-called Kaokoland,
the colonial rule was less direct here than in Fransfontein
(Bollig and Menestrey Schwieger 2014; Menestrey
Schwieger 2015). Even though the research area is ethnically
diverse and pastoralism is practiced with different levels of
market integration, the practices of providing water and graz-
ing are comparable throughout the area. Similar ecological
constraints and organization around drilled boreholes largely
shape the ways water is managed.
People use three strategies to acquire water: (1) construct-
ing dams along seasonal rivers, (2) digging holes into the
sandy beds of the rivers where the water stays long after the
river has stopped flowing at the surface, and (3) drilling bore-
holes to access the groundwater. The technological infrastruc-
ture for these boreholes is heterogeneous: windmills, hand
pumps, electronic motors powered by solar panels, and—by
far the most important—diesel engines.
All water sources but boreholes support only a relatively
low population and livestock density. To populate Namibia’s
rural hinterlands and to compensate for demographic growth,
the state increased the number of boreholes in the northern
region of Kunene by a factor of almost ten between 1960
and 1990 (Bollig 2013:323). Like in other parts of Africa, this
hydrological perforation of the landscape has changed usage
patterns and fostered a more sedentary life style (Gomes 2006;
Picardi and Seifert 1977). Today, water is almost exclusively
provided through boreholes during the dry season. All mem-
bers of a community have access to the water that is pumped
into large, open reservoirs. During the rainy season, dams and
dug holes supplement but do not replace the borehole water
supply. In a nutshell, rural communities in Kunene are highly
dependent on boreholes and their management.
Results
State Policy
Following the Rio 1992 summit (The Earth Summit), re-
sources governance in the global South profoundly changed.
Decentralization and community-based resource governance
became a salient part of the international development agenda
(Falk et al. 2009; Furlong 2010; Taylor 2007). Most impor-
tantly, BThe Earth Summit^ introduced 27 principles that pro-
mote sustainability, poverty eradication, and participation
(Little 1995; UNDSD 1992). For water, Agenda 21 formulates
that its governance should reflect Bas far as possible both the
true cost of water when used as an economic good and the
ability of the communities to pay^ (Agenda 21: Chapter 18).
Equally, the International Conference on Water and the
Environment (ICWE) that met in Dublin the same year pro-
claims in one of its four principles that Bwater has an econom-
ic value in all its competing uses and should be recognized as
an economic good.^
In 1993, the Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Policy
(WASP) of Namibia translated these ideas about water man-
agement into the national context defining Bcommunity own-
ership and management of facilities^ as a guiding principle of
water management for the rural sector (Namibia 1993). Soon
after, the Water Supply Coordination Committee (WASCO),
an organization established to coordinate the process and to
recommend principles for the Namibian situation, formulated
that Bwater is an economic good and that consumers shall
contribute for water supply services^ (Namibia 1997). In prac-
tice, the new policy for the rural water sector led to a signifi-
cant and enduring effort of the state to pass the responsibility
of boreholes and their infrastructure to local user associations
(Falk et al. 2009; Gildenhuys 2010), a process envisioned to
lead to the Bempowerment of the people and the transfer of
authority and assets to the community^ (Namibia 2006:16).
The National Plan includes three steps: firstly, a phase of
sensitizing and mobilizing the communities in CBNRM3 Data collected by Linke in Fransfontein during the dry season 2011.
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related matters and an update of the technical infrastructure
(phase 1: capacity building); secondly, the rehabilitation of wa-
ter points selected for the implementation of CBNRM, the es-
tablishment of Water Point Associations (WPA) and Water
Point Committees (WPC), and the Btraining^ of local commu-
nities to develop and formalize rules of water governance
(phase 2: operation and maintenance); and thirdly, shifting the
ownership of government assets to theWPA. The entire respon-
sibility for all aspects of managing the water infrastructure is
turned over to the community including the replacement of
major technical equipment (phase 3: full cost recovery). To
standardize the process, a Handbook for Water Point
Committees (Namibia 2006) was developed and distributed
by the state to the NGO and state representatives administering
the process on the local level. The handbook and related docu-
ments describe the process to be taken step by step in 11 chap-
ters and propose institutional solutions to the community.
Sharing the costs of water is one of themost salient problems
in water governance. Since most pumps operate with diesel, the
price of water is largely determined by the amount and price of
diesel required for pumping it. In chapter 5, BManaging WPA
Finance,^ the handbook reads: BRecommended is a rate per
head of large or small stock, each member paying a certain rate
per head of large or small [stock] accordingly, as to raise enough
money to sustain the water point^ (Namibia 2006:8). We refer
to this arrangement as the Bper-head-of-cattle rule^ (p.h.o.c.-
rule). In addition, a second payment scheme is introduced. It
recommends equal contributions for all households or individ-
uals, mostly to cover the costs of domestic usage. Following the
wording of the handbook, we call this the Bflat rate rule.^ In
practice, the institutional solutions to cover the costs of water
oscillate between these two extremes. In the former case, con-
tributions are regulated according to the amount of water used.
In the second case, payment for water is a fixed sum and more
independent of usage.
During the process of implementation, emerging institu-
tional arrangements are negotiated with representatives of
the ministry or contracted NGOs. Representatives visit the
communities and call for meetings during which many perti-
nent questions, e.g., access, sanctions for violations of the
rules agreed upon, and—often most importantly—payment
schemes are discussed. Since discussions about the payment
schemes are typically conflict-ridden, the process often re-
quires a number of meetings that stretch over months
(Schnegg and Bollig 2016; Schnegg et al. 2016; Schnegg
and Linke 2015). During the meetings, state representatives
take an active role. They go through the sections of the hand-
book and sensitize the communities to the issues they have to
resolve. While they do not provide any material incentives to
apply a p.h.o.c.-rule or penalize communities that opt for flat
rate rule, the state’s representatives clearly articulate in public
meetings that the p.h.o.c.-rule is what the state favors and what
they perceive to be just and fair.
Micro-politics of Water Governance
As we have seen, the government promoted a proportional
p.h.o.c.-rule through its bureaucrats. At the end of the process,
in which those rules were negotiated, all communities had to
agree upon a management plan, officially signed by the mem-
bers of the committee. The management plan gives a tentative
budget for a water point and specifies rules for how each
member should contribute financially. Equally, the plan de-
fines sanctions for those who do not comply. In the vast ma-
jority of the management plans, communities formally sub-
scribed to a p.h.o.c.-rule that all households should pay ac-
cording to the livestock owned.
However, as interviews and observations reveal across the
three research sites, in many communities, the rule was never
applied or, if it had been, it was altered relatively soon there-
after. When we conducted the up-scaling research in 2012,
only 25 (44.6 %) out of the 56 communities had continued
with a p.h.o.c.-rule. In addition, seven communities (12.5 %)
use an attenuated form in which the rich pay more but not
exactly according to their number of livestock (e.g.,
rich=200 N$, poor=100 N$). This difference in payments
is not as significant as the differences that emerge with exact
livestock counts. In 24 communities (42.9 %), the proportion-
al rule, promoted by the state and NGOs, was never practiced
or replaced by an institution that requires equal payment for all
households (Schnegg et al. 2016). In some of these cases,
money was collected and a trusted person bought diesel with
it. In equally many cases, the households had agreed that each
household would pump for a month or that the households in
charge in that specific month would provide the diesel to a
caretaker in charge of pumping the water. All solutions lead to
equal pay (flat rate rule).
Before we offer an explanation for the institutional diversity
observed, we want to rule out two alternative hypotheses: tech-
nology and a Bmajority vote^ (Anderies et al. 2004; Ostrom
1990). Whereas Anderies et al. (2004) have proposed that tech-
nology plays a central role in institutional design, we find a low
and non-significant relationship between the technological in-
frastructure (solar/diesel) and the payment regime (phi=0.155,
sig=0.244). Alternatively, Ostrom has argued that institutions
tend to develop in ways that serve the majority (Ostrom
1990:193). In the Namibian case for water management that
would mean that households would opt for the solution under
which they would pay less (given their number of animals) and
that a solution would prevail that serves most households best.
A test of the second hypothesis reveals that in most communi-
ties (88.9 %), the majority of households would profit from a
p.h.o.c.-rule. Thus, the hypothesis fails to explain why in a great
many communities the flat rate is carried out.
The account we provide instead takes into account that (1)
a p.h.o.c.-rule produces higher transaction costs than a flat rate
rule, (2) the rich and powerful favor the flat rate rule and profit
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from it, (3) water management overlaps with other social
fields, and (4) the state and its bureaucrats play an active role.
Transaction Costs
To establish and maintain a payment regime requires (1)
collecting and storing money, (2) paying for diesel and repairs,
and, with a p.h.o.c.-rule, (3) counting animals. These costs
involved in implementing a rule are part of the transaction
costs. There are social costs associated with collecting and
keeping money. Social capital and trust are required.
Typically, the person assigned as treasurer keeps the money
in the household and hands smaller sums to the technician/
pumper to hike to the next petrol station to buy diesel. In 65 %
of the cases (N=43), we were able to document that a woman
fulfils the role of treasurer for the water point committee.
Asked why, people readily explain that women, who typically
manage household budgets, are more trustworthy, experi-
enced, and also less mobile than men. These traits reduce the
probability that the money will be spent for other purposes.
These relatively high social costs are one reason some com-
munities apply a flat rate rule without collecting money and
take turns among the households pumping water.
There are also costs associated with counting animals.
Counting 100 or even more animals is extremely laborious.
Typically, livestock from diverse herd owners come to drink at
a water point the same time and it is often challenging to
direct, control, and thus count them separately. Beyond that,
many Ovahimba and some Ovaherero people explained to us
that animals will die once enumerated. This taboo puts an
additional burden on practicing animal counts.
To summarize, the costs for collecting and keeping money
and for buying diesel do not differ between flat rate and
p.h.o.c.-rules. But, there are differences in the ways a flat rate
rule can be implemented to ameliorate social costs: cash based
(assuming those costs) or labor based (avoiding the transac-
tion costs). In contrast, the p.h.o.c.-rule requires counting an-
imals, which comes with burdensome labor and the costs of
working against a cultural taboo. Both institutional regimes
provide for an option in which transaction costs rise above
simply pumping in turns, i.e., collecting the usedmoney based
on flat rate or proportional payment regimes. The more costly
a regime, the more difficult it is to establish and maintain.
Wealth, Bargaining Power, and Institutional Preferences
Economic capital is unevenly distributed in the Kunene region
(Pauli 2011). While we find in almost all communities at least
one household that owns more than 100 cattle, we also find at
least one, and often more, that owns less than 10. These eco-
nomic differences largely shape the social structure of the com-
munities and often result in hierarchical social relationships. In
ethnographic interviews and through observing public
discussions about the most appropriate institutional regime for
water management, we found evidence for a correlation be-
tween wealth in cattle and preference for a particular rule.
Across all three research sites, wealthy herd owners oppose a
p.h.o.c.-rule and opt for a flat rate solution (Menestrey
Schwieger 2015; Schnegg et al. 2016). In this context, we use
the terms wealthy and poor as relative categories to distinguish
the upper quartile of the economic spectrum from the rest.
Often, those are only one or two families who own more than
100 head of cattle. The following excerpt from an interview
with Hermann, an elderly and wealthy cattle owner from one
of the communities surrounding Fransfontein, provides an ex-
ample of the perspective of the wealthy and offers some insights
into the logic of the argument:
Let me put it this way: Jorries owns fifty cows and I own
five. Then the people will say: BWhy is Jorries only
giving 20 Namibian Dollars, and I am also giving 20.
The person with more cattle must give more money.^
(…). [However,] the water point belongs to all of us. We
must understand each other. Today you have five cows,
tomorrow they can become ten, and then Jorries, due to
the theft plaguing us, may soon loose all his animals.
There is one more thing that needs to be considered.
Jorries who is having fifty cows is not only keeping
them for the water, but he is also taking milk from his
animals and gives this to you so you can prepare some
porridge and eat it with the milk.4
Hermann, the wealthy pastoralist cited above, not only of-
fers a clear rejection of a p.h.o.c.-rule but also provides a
justification. First, he refers to the fluctuation in herd sizes.
According to his logic, the rich may be poor tomorrow and
vice versa. Why should community members then care about
complex rules, counting, and proportional thinking? Hermann
goes on to argue that those who own more cattle also have
more milk to share. As I explain in more detail below, the
exchange of milk is salient to the livelihoods of the young
and the poor and establishes both an economic and a social
relationship. Hermann thus embeds the sharing of water into
others transactions and argues that they will balance out across
different exchange spheres and time.
However, the majority of people have a different view. In
contrast to the wealthy few, they plead for a p.h.o.c.-rule. The
following section from an interview with Tobias, a relatively
poor and younger head of household from the northern-most
research site, makes this clear. He argues:
To pay according to the amount of cattle is very good. It is
fair because everyone gets his own water. If I have five
head of cattle and you have a hundred, but both pay the
4 Interview conducted by MS, 10.9.2006 (Fransfontein area).
250 Hum Ecol (2016) 44:245–255
same, the rich one is free because he is using my money.
And I have to pay more than I have—that means that is
not fair.5
In the interview, Tobias argues elaborately against an equal
pay plan and points out that those who own more must also
pay more.
In the research area, age, status, and bargaining power are
typically correlated. However, while most wealthy people are
older, not all elders are rich. The preference for the institutional
regime is strongly linked to the livestock ownership and we did
not meet any member of the economic elite who opted for a
p.h.o.c. rule. In Kunene, the stark economic stratification often
results in hierarchical exchange relationships. For example,
elder Ovahimba and the Ovaherero tend to lend livestock to
younger men, often matrilineal relatives, who in return receive
the right to utilize the milk. On average, more than 10% of the
cattle are leant to other households and young herders even
borrow 95 % of the animals they stay with (Bollig 2000a). In
contrast, wealthy and elder households own almost all of live-
stock in their kraal (an enclosure for cattle or other livestock).
In addition to livestock ownership, the Namibian state pro-
vides all citizens aged 60 and above with a pension providing
enough to buy the basic necessities. In a poverty ridden envi-
ronment, even this small amount of income can establish an
economic position of superiority (Schnegg et al. 2013). To
summarize, wealthier people prefer the flat rate rule.
Typically, they are also community elders. Aswewill see, those
who own more use their social status to push an institutional
regime that is favorable for them (flat rate). The nature of social
ties is key to understanding why the wealthier often succeed.
Social and Cultural Embeddedness
The communities in Kunene are relatively small and social
embeddedness is high (Bollig 2000b; Schnegg 2015;
accepted; Schnegg and Linke 2015). Dense and multiplex
social networks constitute a specific social fabric with far-
reaching consequences for building and maintaining institu-
tions, as the following case of Justus and his uncle reveals.
On Vingerklip,6 a community in the Fransfontein area,
Alfons, the head of the wealthiest household, refused to pay
more than the rest and thus to support a p.h.o.c.-rule. His
nephew Justus is the chairperson of the water point commit-
tee. When our talk came to water, Justus bitterly complained
about his uncle and his refusal to pay according to his number
of cattle owned. When I asked him, why he, as the elected
chairperson, and the majority of the households could not
push through their understanding of a just and fair rule, he
explained:
Since we were young, we knew exactly, who is who,
and that you have to have this respect for, let us say Bthis
is my uncle, I can’t talk to my uncle like that.^ He is the
big one in the family who’s running the house, is the one
making the decisions. I must not talk against my uncle.
So, if my uncle says something, whether it is right or
whether it is wrong, I have to follow the rules. So, that
causes a lot of problems in the community, because now,
the families were afraid to talk to their uncle, because
they were keeping this respect.7
Justus explains that the dense kinship network and the nor-
mative expectations that come along make it impossible to
force his uncle to accept a particular position. Among all kin-
ship ties, that between a nephew and his uncle (mother’s
brother) is one of the most salient. A man will inherit property
(especially cattle) from his maternal uncle and is supposed to
be subordinate, helpful, and respectful to him. In Kunene,
kinship, generations, and gender structure social interactions
to a large degree and as the case study reveals, water manage-
ment is part of the wider social field.
In recent years, Cleaver has argued convincingly that re-
source governance is not only socially but also culturally em-
bedded (Cleaver 2012). She coined the term institutional
bricolage to indicate how Bnew^ rules built on existing forms.
With the case analyzed here, this becomes evident when we
look at the justifications people bring forward for focusing on
the central cultural unit, the household (Otjiherero: oanda,
Khoekhoegowab: ||gaus), instead of counting animals.
All we normally do is to contribute per household.
Therefore for us it is never a problem, because we are
used to the issue of receiving something per household or
paying, contributing per household. Even as we are
talking now, if I slaughter cattle, and I divide this meat
among the households I will divide it per household with-
out considering how many people there are. Many of the
things or activities we do it per household. That is our
normal routine, that’s why it was never a problem for us,
since we are used to this practice of per household.8
Here, Pete, a relatively rich household head, argues that for
sharing water rules should apply that work in other cultural
fields as well. When benefits like meat are shared, this is not
done in proportion to needs but instead all households get the
same. The same logic, he continues, should apply for cost
sharing as well. Both ethnographic vignettes show that insti-
tutions are not isolated form the wider social fabric and that
the rules that emerge can only be understood if we take this
social and cultural embedding into account.
5 Interview conducted by DM, 13.10.2011 (Okangwati area).
6 All community names are synonyms.
7 Interview conducted by MS, 20.3.2014 (Fransfontein area).
8 Interview conducted by KG, 26.10.2011 (Otwani area).
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Given the three dynamics just described, (1) higher trans-
action costs, (2) individual preferences, and (3) the social
embeddedness of water management regimes, we would ex-
pect all communities to shift from the p.h.o.c. to a flat rate rule.
All three dynamics work in the same direction. However, and
as we have seen, this is not the case.
Linking State Policies and Micro-politics
To answer why, I ask when the institutions emerge that the
majority claims to be just and fair. A closer examination of
those cases reveals that they share a key characteristic. State
ministries and NGOs contracted by the state maintain strong
involvement in the local water governance in these cases. As
we have seen before, not only local actors have different in-
terests and bargain about the proper institutional solution but,
in these cases especially, the state and its local representatives
do so as well (Menestrey Schwieger 2015; Schnegg et al.
2016).
An interview with Martha who works for the Ministry of
Agriculture,Water and Forestry and is responsible for roughly
100 water points shows the state at work. When we talked
about my observation that most communities switch to a flat
rate rule, she responded: BIt is not fair. But as soon as we turn
our back the community big men come and tell the rest what
to do.^ In the course of the interview, she repeatedly states
how frustrated she is that she, the official from the Ministry,
cannot even implement the rule in the community where she is
farming herself. Asked where the p.h.o.c.-rule is actively
working, she starts talking about the community Duurwater
where an active young woman is the chairperson. To support
her, Martha drove early in the morning, when the cattle drink,
to Duurwater to count the animals with the other committee
members. BThen, we approached the poor households and
talked to them about the different rules and encouraged them
to stand up and talk in the meeting. In the meeting, we would
support them.^9
Much of the institutional reconfiguration in rural Namibia
takes place in a social environment where the state has explicit
preferences and at least some means to pursue them. The
institutional regimes that emerge can only be understood if
we consider the distribution of power at the local level and
the role of the state simultaneously. Recognizing this allows us
to formulate a hypothesis, which combines the arguments and
observations made so far: Communities will employ a flat rate
rule unless the state actively supports the less wealthy pasto-
ralists and their interests.
Table 1 tests this hypothesis and shows the correlation be-
tween the institutional regime (flat rate versus p.h.o.c.-rule)
and the involvement of the state coded as discussed above.
The results clearly show that the involvement of the state can
explain to a significant degree the institutional outcome
(phi=−0.478, sig=0.000).10 This confirms that in communi-
ties where the state is only weakly involved a flat rate rule is
more likely to emerge. In those communities, the three dy-
namics analyzed above push the institutional regime toward
a flat rate rule.
An institutional form that diverts from the main pattern
offers additional insights into the dynamics observed. In seven
communities, an attenuated p.h.o.c. rule is practiced and the
rich pay twice as much as the poor. A closer examination of
these communities reveals that the state is comparably inac-
tive (coded as Bweak^) in six of them (85.7 %). They thus lack
the external support to establish a p.h.o.c. rule. In Table 1, all
six cases fall into the category of proportional rule and weak
state involvement and make up half of the 12 communities
here. This rule goes part way to meet governmental and com-
mon fairness concerns while avoiding the transaction costs of
animal counts. This twilight institution (Lund) that blends two
forms appears to be a compromise that local power dynamics
allow for.
Discussion
Currently, water governance in rural Namibia is changing pro-
foundly. The process is in accordance with many post-Rio
environmental policies and was initiated by the Namibian
state that withdrew from financing water directly while for-
mulating clear specifications on how local institutions should
develop (Falk et al. 2009). After intense discussions, most
people in the research area agree with the state’s preference
that the best choice is to pay according to livestock ownership
(p.h.o.c.-rule). However, in many communities, this rule does
not emerge or prevail and Bsocial arrangements are often ef-
fectively stronger than the new rules^ (Moore 2000:58). To
understand why, we have to take into account (1) the transac-
tion costs involved in establishing a rule, (2) the particular
9 Interview conducted by MS, 25.3.2014 (Fransfontein area).
Table 1 Engagement of the state and institutional regimes (N = 56,
phi =−0.478, sig = 0.000)
Water institution
State/NGO involvement Flat rate p.h.o.c.-rule Total
Strong 4 20 24
Weak 20 12 32
Total 24 32 56
10 The analysis treats the six cases with an attenuated p.h.o.c.-rule where
the richer people pay more but not exactly according to the numbers
owned as cases of a p.h.o.c.-rule. If they were treated as flat rate or
excluded from the analysis, the correlation would be even higher.
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interests of rich and poor pastoralists, (3) the embeddedness of
resource management, and (4) the role of the state.
The analysis shows that transaction costs gradually rise
from pumping water in turns, to collecting money for flat rate
contributions, to an attenuated p.h.o.c. rule, and a proportional
payment regime that involves animal counts. The higher the
costs, the more difficult it is to establish and maintain the
institutional regime. As we have seen, people seek an institu-
tional regime that serves their material ends; while the poor
favor a proportional payment, the rich opt for flat rate rule
(Knight 1992, 1998; Knight and Sened 1995) and what ulti-
mately emerges reflects power dynamics among community
residents and the role of government or NGO representatives.
Cleaver has explained that rural water management is so-
cially and culturally embedded (Cleaver 2001, 2012; Cleaver
and Franks 2005; Cleaver and de Koning 2015). Following
what Cleaver coined an institutional bricolage, the rich use
sharing models that apply in other cultural domains to justify
their cause. In Kunene, sharing water cannot be separated
from sharing ancestries, food, and grazing, and salient kinship
relations overrule and restrict behavior in other social do-
mains. Even if the poor are in the majority, social
embeddedness works in support of the elite and makes it hard
or even impossible to influence or even sanction them
(Schnegg and Linke 2015). Left alone, the rich typically suc-
ceed in establishing a rule that favors them.
This finding is supported by a number of studies about the
decentralization of forestry. For example, Kumar has shown
the consequences new forms of participation can have.
Among forest users in India, he finds that Bnew^ regimes
reflect the social preference of the rural non-poor and that
the poor are likely to lose in the long run. As in the case
presented here, existing power structures and inequalities are
determining and readily reproduced (Kumar 2002). In a sim-
ilar vein, Kumar, Singh, and Kerr (2015) have reported that
the implementation of democratic decentralization of natural
resources governance has been strongly opposed by powerful
interests and that many of its provisions related to community
rights over forests have remained unimplemented in various
regions of India (Kumar et al. 2015). In much the same way,
Parajuli et al. (2015) demonstrate that in Nepal’s community,
forestry benefits of a co-management program are greater in
rich households and that the poor pay the highest indirect costs
(Parajuli et al. 2015). Agrawal and Gupta (2005) have simi-
larly shown that the richer, more powerful rural residents with
higher-caste status tend to participate and profit most from
community forestry projects (Agrawal and Gupta 2005). To
summarize, if left alone, and much like in Kunene, the rich are
typically successful in establishing institutional regimes that
work in their interests.
However, and as Moore has already shown, states set the
agenda and support specific governance models through
legislation. Furthermore, bureaucrats and contracted NGOs
help in implementing legislation at the local level as Lund
(2007a) explained. In this context, a significant number of
studies reveal a liaison between the state and local elites
(Blaikie 2006; Ribot 2009; Scott 1998). For example,
Agrawal and Chhatre (2006) found that powerful external
state officials hinder the adoption of governance rules best
suited to local conditions and that their presence has a negative
effect on forestry management while simultaneously
protecting elite interests (Agrawal and Chhatre 2006). Much
in contrast, we found the Namibian state to be supportive of
the poor and their social, economic, and environmental
needs. The engagement of state representatives differs
significantly between communities and only where they
stay engaged and support those with less wealth and
bargaining power, the p.h.o.c. rule remains. While the
Namibian state is valued for being comparably uncor-
rupt, it might also be that the supportive role of bureau-
crats is related to the fact that with community manage-
ment of water costs, there are no profits to be shared out.
Hence, opportunities and incentives to support a particu-
lar program that benefits the wealthy are low.
Conclusion
This article has shown that institutional development in
Namibian communities can only be understood at the inter-
section of different processes involving a myriad of actors. Its
findings have some political implications. Over recent de-
cades, nation states have increasingly withdrawn from local
resource management, and self-governance (CBNRM) has
become a guiding principle of many development efforts—
the idea being that turning ownership and responsibility over
to local communities will empower them and help to eradicate
poverty (Blaikie 2006; Ribot 1999; Ribot et al. 2006).We find
that left alone, the rich typically succeed in establishing insti-
tutional regimes much to their own economic advantage. Only
if the state remains in an active role, it can ensure the interests
of the poor.
In this paper, I have described rural water management at
one point in time in one region of Namibia. As I have ex-
plained, wealth and age are correlated and the young who
oppose a flat rate rule today are likely to be rich in a decade
or two. It remains an interesting challenge for further work to
see whether these preferences are constant across time or
whether they change with new social and economic positions.
From the observations made, and the dominance of the eco-
nomic motive, I would hypothesize the latter to be the case.
While I was able to show how Bnew^ institutions are ne-
gotiated at present, further research should show the conse-
quences these changes have. As we have seen, often a rule
prevails in which the poor subsidize the water consumption of
the rich. This might widen the gap between rich and poor, as
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initial simulations suggest (Schnegg et al. 2016). However,
state involvement and a proportional rule could lead to nega-
tive consequences for the poor if the rich households increas-
ingly feel that once everyone pays for his or her precise water
usage, everyone should also care for his or her other concerns.
Should the wealthier part of the population in Kunene with-
draw from the moral obligations and the support they channel
into exchange networks, the consequences would be severe
for those who have much less. To follow up the consequences
of particular institutional regimes implemented for water man-
agement in the communities of Kunene is one of the most
interesting and important future research tasks for understand-
ing change and its economic, moral, and social potentials.
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